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on 17 January I98O ltr trloreland and 25 co-signatories tabled a motion for
a resolution pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules of Procedure on the use of
transport from the Cbmecon countries (Doc. 1-6g3/79).
On 18 ilanuaiy 1980 the motLon for d resolutLon vras refarred to the Commlttee
on Transport ae the cornmittee respdngible.
on 28 8€bruary 1980 the @mmittee on lranEport appointed ltr Karl-Heinz Hdffmann
rapporteur.
The committee considered the motion for a resolution and the report at its
meetings of 30 lrtarch and 30 April 1982.
The motion for a resolution was adopted unanimously on 30 April L982.
Took part in the vote: Mr SeefelQ, chairmani Dame Shelagh Roberts and
Irlr Karoyannis, vice-chairmeni Mp Hoffmann, rapporteuri Mrs von Aremann,
I'lr Buttafuoca, Mr cottrell, !1r gabert, Mr Krinkenborg, Mr Moorhouse and
Mr ltloreland (deputizLng for Mr Marshall).
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Allhe Committee on Transport hereby submits to the European Pat'liament the
follorring motion for a resolution togettrer with explanatory statement:
IIoTION FOR A RESOI,UTTON
on
relations between the EEg and the COUECON countries in the fiel6 of
tranaport' poliq;
@,
A.. having regard to the motLon for a resolution by ltlr ti[oreland and ot]rerE
(ooc. L-6a5/791,
B. having rcarrd to the report of the Committee on Transport
(Doc. L-203/821,
C. h'aving regard to th€ earlier reportE of its appropriate cornmitteea, in
particular Docs. 89/78 and 5Ln9 and the resolutions adopted on the basiE
of these reportsl,
D,. having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social Comnittee on
problems of transport between the European Community and Eastern.Europe
of 2i/24 November L977,
E.in the hope of contributing to further det6nte and further lmprovemcnts
in Eaet-West European trade,
F,concerned at the increasing use of transport m6des from the COIIECON
countrles both in East-Irlest Elrropean trade and in world trade in general,
c.concerned at the emergence of an imbalance which operatea increaeingly
to the disadvantage of Community transport undertakings bccause the
Comecon countries actlvely exploit the advantagee of free world trade
while not granting the same advantageE to weEtern transport undcrtaklnge
under their centrally controlled state-trading system and centrally
controlled transport system,
H.cAncerned aleo at the fact that the lower prices, thanks to which the
OOUECOI transport undertakings penetrate world transport outside the
COITIECON a!ea, are not baEed on lower costs but on hidden eubeidies
from general public funds and therefore adversely affect the standard
of supplies to the inhabitants of the COI,IECON countries,
1 o,l no. c 163, lo July Lg7B, 
.p.4g2 o.l tto. c 140, 5 June Lglg, p.171
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1. Believes that only by concerted action on the part of the European
Communities can the continued penetration of CoMECoN countries in the
field of transport be halted and consequently calls on the Commission
to devise and propose to the Council of Ministers Community measures
to improve cooperation with the COMECON countries in the field of
transport; in this connection a consultation procedure should be
established and Community powers created in aI1 the relevant fields of
transport policy;
2. Regrets that the transport provisions of the Helsinki Final Act have
not yet been implementqd and that no progress was made in the follow-
up conferencesi
3. Calls on the Commission to examine ways of improving the situation byjoint negotiations or ways in which the Community may support the
Member States in bilateral and multilateral negotiations;
4. Calls on the Commission and the Member states to ensure that adequate
attention is paid in all trade agreements to the Communityra transport
interests so that these do not take second place behind trade interests
as has usually been the case in the past;
5. Insists that the principle of reciprocity be applied in relations with
the COMECON countries as this is the only basis for the coexistence
of the trade and transport policies of groups of countries with
different economic structuresi
5. Calls on the Commission to create as a preventive measure a set of
instruments for Community counter-measures which can be implemented
effecitvely if negotiations do not read to the apprication of the
principle of reciprocity i i
7 . Demands also that the Corunission further expand the market observatio n
system in the transport sector in order to create a real basis for
negotiat:-ons and possible counter-measures; the system should also
include combined transport undertakings such as the Trans-Siberian
Container Line; overall, however, there is a need for concrete action
rather than mere observationi
8. Stresses that under the principle of reciprocity Community transport
undertakings must have an adequate share of bilateral transport and
that they must not be excluded from transport between or with third
countries as a result of various restrictions, artificial price cutting
etc. i
9. Urges that an attemPt be made through negotlations to ensure that the
CoIt{ECoN state-trading organizations also associate Comnunity undertakings
in their transport, even if they sell all the goods under the cif clause
and buy them under the fob clause, which gives them the right to decide
on the transport undertaking to be usedi
10. Calls on the Commission to investjqat-e the extent to which charges or
taxes are imposed on community transport undertakings in coMEcoN
countries which the CoMECON undertakings do not need to pay within the
Community;
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Il. points out that the administrative formalities at the CO!4ECON borders
are most time-consuming and expensive and that attemPts must therefore
be made to make progress through negotiations in this area too;
12. Ca1ls on the Commission to examine without delay what Community
measures can be taken to protect the employees of Community transport
undertakings in COMECON countries and in particular to ensure their
freedom of movement in ports and to repatriate them in cases of illness
or when they are reliqved of their duties for other reasons and when
they are held in custody pending inquiries following road accidents,
13. Requests that the Comrrunity should also assert the principle of
reciprocity in relation to the freedom to canvass for cargoes and the
right of establishment, to ensure that coMEcoN transport agencies
may only establish themselves or be associated in Community agencies
and other transport undertakings in return for the same rights in
the coMEcoN countriesi here one might consider setting up agencies
with representatives from transport associations and public authorities
which could then negotiate with the COMECON transport authorities;
14. Points out that in the long term the real interests of transport
users are no different from those of the transport undertakings in
the Conmunity and calls on the transport users not to work against
transport interests for the sake of short-term advantages;
15. Notes that the problems created by COMECON in the field of transport
are shared by many non-Community countries and, consequently, urges
the Commission and Council to utilize European and International forums
such as the European Conference of Transport l,tinisters for the purpose
of achieving a strong international approach to the issuei
16. Instructs its President to forward this resolution and the report of
its committee to the Council and the Commission'
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1.
EXPIANATORY STATEMENT
I. General rguarkE
Trade between the EEC and the CDMECIN (Council for,t'hrtual'EconomiB Aid)
-countries is expandi"ng. i11. the long term; a. trend Which ls welcorned,
and deaifed by both sidcs.. Unfortunatelyl .howerer, ttlbre. are,Etill
a ngrdp_er;.of imbalances.,and differenges ,in thie trade.,itlfOst"COIIECON-
countries fild it_di,ff,iault to balance rh+_r rl3Le_wil}Jtne_fte"r,, :.-
which_-1" ,ny they-are always raisinf large,,L?ans 
-and tffiqg--to.
save foreigp exchange py linked "transactions or to fo{F: gl+. Western
undertakings by'applying control nreasures in service. tran€actions as
a mehns of na!<ing up for -'heir trade balance deficit in this sector.
Unfortunately, this pollcy of tihe cOlUcON countries hag a very darraging
effect on Wcst€rn undertakinEs in the transport scctor.
'In fact the EEC countries adopt a rattrer concillatory attitude in
government negotiations becltrse they acccpt the argumcnt ttrat the
Eastern European countries need foreign exchange in order to equalize
their balance of paymente. E<port intcrests usually predominate,
during such negotiations to the dstrlurntof ttre wGstern countlles'
transport lnterests. In future tiris trend should be reverged and
negotiations on trade agreements, whether conducted by the t{ember
States or the Community, should be used to promote the transPort
interests of the Conmunity.
4. In the long run this situation should not be acccpted, sincifarefgn
exch&ge...is'not.the only problem involved. llhere are other reasons
why the coMEcgN countrires want to Prevcnt tl€stern undertakinge from
participating in goods transport where poesible. Among othcrt they arc
aiming at thc peaceful infiltlation of westetn countrics and markctg'
to which thcre could be no objection if in return they allowcd free
economic contacts in their own countries. In fact, hor'vever' thgy firnly
protect thelr terrl,tory from Western trading and tran8Port actlvLties'
They can do so because both trade in statc monopolies and trangPort,
under their integrated tcrritorial transPort planning syBtem, are centrally
ticntrol led.
5. Central planning often introduces an element of uncertainty into transport
arrangements with the COMECON countries because mistakes in planning
cannot be corrected as readily as in a free economy. The periodic
shortages in COMECON countries are partly due to transport problems.
western undertakings can hardly ever help out because of the
protectionism in the transPort sector.
6. The COMECON countries on the other hand exploit the freedom that exists
in world trade and world transport.
2.
3.
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B,
7.
8.
9.
Given the centrally controlled structure of their economy .J tt"n"pott
system, the CgMECOtt countries are able to squeeze competitore out of the
market by Eetting unprofitably low rates which they can maintain for
years. Ttrere is no doubt that once the Western competitors have die-
appeared from the market, the state-economy cduntries will raise the
transport tariffs chargcd to WeBtern freight companies shar-p_ly, and will
eventually push them up to eicessive levels. Ttris will be done 
with
as little tegard for cost as ever ' In'that sense the state monopoly
canconductitselfinawaywhichwouldonlybepossibleintheWest
in extreme monopoly situations' which' however' are no longer 
per-
rnittedinanywesternEuropeancountryunderthelegislationon
cartels.
IhosewegtEuropeanfreightcompanieswhichinitiallywelcomethelow
rates of COMECON transport undertakingE are therefore being
nerY short-sighted'
Thereisanotherconsideration.Thestate-economycountrieshave
to pay a price for charging such low rates whilci at the Same time
forcibly expanding the transport sector in international trade'
By charrging below cost, they are wasting factors of production'
TtreydosoforthesakeofexpandingtheirexternaleconomicPov,er
withaviewtoeconomicpenetrationoftheWestandinparticular
the Third world. obviously this is at the expense of supplies to
theirownpeople:inthewest\,gewouldsayatthetaxpayer'sexPens€.
Productionfactorswhichareusedwithouteconomicprofitdonothing
toimprovethestandardoflivingandconsumptioninstate.economy
countries.
Sincetheaecountriesdonotpermitthedemocra'ticexpressionof
opinion and since ttre unions merely ProP uP the power of the state'
thereisnowayofcombattingthisdisregardforconsumerinterests.
Sotheconsumergoodsaectorandeventhefoodsectorareneglected,
which reads to the necessity of subsidized imports even of such
foods as butter and cereals from the West'
If one looks at the whole vicious circle' one can see that the West
is giving the state-trading countries a hand in undercutting' un-
dermininganddab.agingthewesterneconomybyalwaysbeingwilling
to bridge the gaPs resulting from wrong planning and from the attchpted
expansionofexternal.conomicandpoliticalPowerbeyondactual
economic regources and in many cases even to avert disasters'
EasternEuropeancompetitioncannotbeconibattedbymarltct.economy
methods. Even,if the rates charged by western transporters \^'er€
subsidizeddowntotheEasternEuropeanlevel,westernundertakings
10.
11.
t2.
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lrouId not obtain any freight, since the allocation of charters iE as
much in the handE of centrally-controlled state-bocltds as the transPort
sector. In the absence of the freedom to canvasa for cargoeE, the
freight would also go to Eastern European transport firms even if the
WeEt could lowcr not only its costs but also ite prices thanks to
improved organization.
._--_-:-_-.--
13. Since the Etate-trading companies systematically buy fob and sell
cif, they can take over the control and transport not only of their
owr €xports but also of imports ftom the Weet.
L4. lrhe West cannot embark on a subsidy race with the COMECON countries.
Nor can itrstart organizing lts trade with Eastern Europe oil the same
state-monopoly lines as Eaatern Europers Westeri trade. Yet it is
not difficult to find a fornula to resolve these difficultiee, and'
as a rule this formula :,-s also accepted-Ey'tne state-tra6ing r-i,. r'-
countries. It is called reciprocity.
15. rf the west appliia ttre reciprocity formula Etrictly ln all areas of
the traneport sector, this would resolve moEt of the difficulties.
15. All it requires in the West is for everyone to realize that there is
no point in exploiting the short-term advantat'es which thd COMECON count-
ries offer for political reasons at th€ ej<i2ened of theiri.odn citlzenE'.
L7. The long-term aim must be fair play based on reciprocal advantages.
That means the state-economy countries can only be given freedom to
advertise for frei$ht in the West if they in return are prepared to
aIlow Western firms a share in the allocation of Eastern exports and
to apply prices adapted to coats,.
18. 
, 
" Ttre various types of transport are,affeeted by these problems to
varying degrees.
Rail transport suffers least from this situation, since it is state
controlled in the West too, so that there can be no excessive
penetration by exploiting the advantages of a free market. Moreover,
the railways are organized in regional monopolies.
19. In air transPort, scheduled services are less severely affected than
charter services, because unequivocal bilateral arrangements usually
prevent the COI{ECON airlines from doninating scheduled services.
Community airlines are at a clear disadvantage in charter traffic,
particularly to tourist destinations in the COIIECON countries.
2C . rn road haulage and inland navigati; th" prour.. is toniineaTo--
bilateral and transit transport since these inland modes of transport
are significant only between hEighbouring countries.
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21. Maritime shipptng, however, is faced with all the problems which only
arise in part in the case of the other modes of transports EEC fleets
are at a severe disadvantage and may even be driven out,d btlaterat
transport by not being allowed to bid for freight in COMECON countries
and by the total state control of cargo acquisition in the West;
western fleets are undercut in cross-trade by the setting of uneconomic
rates for as long as the Western shipping companies or conferences
can keep up the competition.
22. In spite of these different effects on the different modes of transport,
the problem is a single one which must be sorved by a coordinated
approach to its various aspects.
23. There is no doubt that the EEC has the major responsibility and
important task here of taking the initiative to ensure that the
Member states employ their joint negotiating por{er to assert the
principle of reciprocity vis-i-vis the CO!4ECON countries.
24. where their negotiating power proves inadequate, counter-measures
will have to be takeni and here too it would be better for them to
be decided upon and impremented jointly by the EEc countries, even
where they onry rerate to transport in individual Member states.
Ir. Rail
25. The East-west European problems assume a rather different complexion
in the field of rail transport than in that of other modes of transport.
Since each state has a monopoly over its own railways participatlon
by the railways of countries involved in cross-frontier transport is
normally on the basis of the distance covered on their territory; each
railway comPany calculates its own domestic rates and in the case
of rates carcurated on an international basis the earnings from
freight are divided up according to contractual rul_es.
26. An aggressive COMECON transport policy can take the following forms:
Firstl)2, the COMECON state traffic control authorities may decide on
a route which will keep the transport on their own railway network
as long as possible, even if this means a detour. By undercutting the
tariffs they can then ensure that the overall transport price is no
higher although the distance may be greater, and that the coMEcoN
railwayst share of the revenue is increased.
A second possibility is for the COMECON countries to charge very 1ow
rates on their railways in order to make overland transport through
their territory more economic than transport by sea or road along
other routes. Examples are transport from central Europe via the
soviet union to the Middle East and, in particular, transport to the
Far East by the Trans-Siberian Railway for which, as we know a second,
more northerly track is nowbeing laid which may increase the competition
with shipping even further in the future. This competition between
various routes arso occurs in transport from south-east Europe to
northern EuroPe where the route may run either through the GDR or though
the FRG' 
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As regards the Trans-Siberian railway, the Commission is currently
in the process of preparing a study. The committee on Transport
would like to point out that transport via the Canadian land bridge
. _________also competes with the Trans-Siberian railway.
27 ' while lhri"r"* -"i thi" competition between various railway ,o.ar--
must not be overestimated at this stage, the forecast made in theESC 1977 report (p. 156) has proved accurate. rhe Ese thought the
. 
bhdre of rail traffic in East-west European trade wourd farr even furtherbecause since western railways are state-run too the coMEcoN countrieswant to eliminate a mode of transport that does not enable them toassert their own modes of transport suffici-ently in the west.
2A. Since L977, i.e. fairly recently, the distrtbution of revenua fromtransport has shifted conliderably against the railways. Ttre rairwaysremain the most importani: means of transport in trade with the croluEcoNcountries, but their predominance is being challenged by the sharprise in inrand navigation and shipping. Hitherto dr,. rise in the priceof energy has not red to a shift from road to rail either.
The community might seek to obtain further standardization of transportlegislation'and transport operations through the governments representedin the ocrr' This however only applies to transport to the soviet union
and the countries beyoqd. unlike the other European states, the sovletUnion is not a member of OCTI in Berne but belongs to the OSZD (Organi_
zatsiya sodruchestva Zheleznykh Dorog) together with other EasternEuropean and Asian countries. As a resurt crl4 freight law also does notapply to transport with the ussR. The goods train and passenger sepvicetimetable conferences function smoothly.
some of the problems could presumabry be solved by croser cooperationbetryeen EEC railway companies.
The probrems in the railway sector are not as serious as in some othertransport sectors, although the sltuation may worsen in the future ifthe col'iEcoN countries improve their infrastructure and when the Rhlne_Main-Danube canar. is compreted, which wirr make it easier for them totransport their former rail freight to the west by other means oftransport
fII. Road
No improvements have occurred in road transport with the coMEcoN
countries in recent years. EEc undertakings still have a very qnsatis_
factory share of road transport although their share of traneport with
individual countries and in various directions varies widely. .The
situation ie worst with respect to the Soviet Union, where Western
undertakings play virtuarry no part in spite of the increase in
traffic.
29.
30.
31
Up to now the bilateral agreements Eeem to
since the EEC quotas are often not filled.
-L2-
have made no difference,
32.
PE 73 .4L7 /tin.
---..- :]:-- 
__-_-____'. =---__-___ l--_33. Although it looke as though the discussion which haE arisen within
the Community on its inadequate participation in East-Weet European
road transPort is having some effect in the COMECON countricg, thcre
can be no question of Community aid for Weetern European road trans-
Port undertakings. The catalogue of demands drafted in thc 1977 ESc
report therefore remaine unchanged:
- 
agreements on equal access to the market by a system of lieenses
for bilatoral and transit traffici
- agreements on aceess to loads by ensuring freedom of estabtishment
coupled with possibilities for gecuring Ioads, if nccascary by
traf fie-sharing agreements ;
- 
ban on exorbitant road tolls and traneit levies by the CC)!,IECON
countries;
- rules governing the picking-up of return loads or addl.tlonal lorde in
transit;
- reduction of the high visa fees charged by COMECON countries and
introduction of permanent vieas for lorry crewsi
- recognition by all COMECON countries of the 'green ingurance.card'
thus putting an end to the need for eeparate insurances for vehiclee;
- simplification and acceleration of customs proceduresi
- 
guarantee of adequate stop*6y"r" for Iorry crelusi
- legal protection for lorry crews, involved in accidents.
on 14 January 1982 the commission submitted to the councir a proposal
for a decision on the collection of information concerning the activities
of road hauliers participating in the carriage of goods to and from certain
non-member countries (Doc. COM(81) 716 final - Doc. L-994/8L1. The
Committee will be drafting a separate report on this.
34. Social provisions for drivers should also include improving overnight
accommodation and catering facilities. In many COMECON countries
there is no 'social infrastructurer for long-distance driversi the
Community could urge that such facilities should be created, at least
on the main routes. When accidents occur, drivers from Western
countries are often held in custody for unduly long periods even when
it has become clear that they were not responsible for the accident.
We must of course also insist that drivers from COMECON countries
should not be unjustifiably detained following accidents in the West.
In addition to the duration of custody, the transport negotiations
should also cover the issues of bail, visits by relatives, legaI
counsel, information to relatives and prison conditions.
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35. The Community could involve itself in all these
pressure on the COMECON countries. In the case
situation ln the transport eector seems to have
of the trade talks. The same should be,possible
CO!4ECON countriee.
issues and exert
of Yugoslavia, the
improved as a result
in the case of the
36. A fairly recent attempt made by the transport undertakings to improvc
the situatlon which has some prospect of success ie the formation of
'cooperative companies' including coMEcoN transtrrcrt undertakings.
The community ought to support thiE initiative where possible.
IV. Inland watenravs
37. rnland water:way shlpping between the coMEcoN countries and
is negligible compared to the vorume of community shipping
It has al-so fallen slightly sinee L9?7 .
the Conmunity
as a whole.
38. The bulk of the traffic flowe between the Federal Republic of cermany
and the coMEcoN countries. Thig is followed by the much leeser traffle
between the NetherlandE and Belgiun and these eountriee, while the
traffic between other EEC states and the COMECON eountrles is insignifi-
cant. The traffic for 1979 can be broken down as follows:
Countries Tonnea
the COI'IECON countries bv countrv
L979
Federal Republie of Germany 
- cDR
Federal Rcpublic of Germany 
- 
poland
Federal Rcpublie of cermany 
- Czeehoslovakia(of which on. th6 Danube)
Belgium- GDR
Netherlands 
- GDR
Other EEC eountriee 
- GDR
Belgium- poland
Netherlands 
- 
poland
Other EEC countries 
- 
poland
4,326,640
960,000
761, 000
(29,7001
LLz,4L4
96,809
3, 0gg
72,464
30,871
2,422
Source: UfNF
Traffic along the Elbe between czeehoalovakia and the Federal Rcpublicis confined armost entirery to transit traffic via the port of Eamburg
- 
where czechoslovakia has free port rights 
- overaeas or vice Eeraa.
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39. The volume of
of Germany and
erossing-point
traffic in 1979 on the
the CoIttECoN countries
waa aa followg:
Danube between the Federal Republic
at the Passau frontier
Countries Tonncg
and Eastern Eurooa
L979
Federal Republic of Germany 
-
alI
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
Yugoslavia
Rumania
Soviet Union
Itungary
L31,772
29,380
45,979
150,493
117,835
55I, 3g 5
lt
I
il
I
tl
ti
I
,t
Total 1,036,945
Source: UINF
Federal Gcrman shlpping has an appror<lmatcly 16% gharc of this traffic.
40. fhe Fedcral Minictry of Transport has formally authorizcd gsmc pollsh
inland watcrway vcsgclc to earry frelght betureen the Fcderal Rcpublic
and othcr EEC countrice and Switzcrland (third eountry traffie) and
within thc Fcderal Rcpublie (cabotagc) during the wintcr monthg. Ehis
authorization wag granted to 20 Potish ships in the wintcr of 19g0,/g1.
4L. The fo1l'orring observations can bc made as rcgards transport priccs:
The freight rates for community traffic with poland are unaatisfaetory.
They have been raised since L977 but still do not fully eover costs.
42. on the Danubc, frelght rateg for traffie with thc Eaetcrn Danube states
remained statie betwecn 1955 and L977. Slnec 1978 verisug annual
adJustmente have been made to the cost trend. But in spitc of intengive
rationalizatLon and improvcments in thcir fleet ctrueture, weatcrn
shipping eompanics are still not fully covcring their eoste. That is
why the Bavarian Lloyd AG in Regensburg rcceivee cost-egualizing eubsidiee
from public funde.
43. rnland shipping bctwccn Eastcrn Europe and the community follows thc
waterways conneeting the Oder, Elbe and Rhine with eaeh othar, and
especiaLly the Elbe and the lr{ittelland Canal, and the Danube ln the
south.
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on the northern waterr.rays, the traffic flows between the people,e
Republic d Po1and and the cerman Democratic Republie and the pcdcral
Republic of Germany, and also other EEC Member States.
The traffic with the Republic of czechoslovakia is one-sided.,.
rt occurs mainly along the Elbe between Czcehoelovakia and Hasiburg and
is operated onry by czech veseele. Exceptionalry theae vesscls may
also use the Mittelland ctnal as far as Bruswick and the Elbe-Lubeck
canal as far as Lflbeck. community veseers do not at prcscnt cail to
Czechoslovakia.
44- Danube traffic involvee onty the Eaatern Danube gtates, Auetria and
the Fedcral Republie of ccrmany. vceeels from other EEc Mcmbcr statcg
are free to carry goods on the Danube under the Bclgrade Act but do
not do so rt present.
45. The Main-Danube Canal whieh will link the Danube with the eentrat and
western EuroPcan waterrrays and will thcrcfore permit transSrort betwecn
the eastern Danube gtatcs and the Community is under eonstruetion.
Inveatmcnt ig restrieted at present, however, bceaure of budgetary
difficulties and the date of compretion is uncertain.
46. one imtrrortant measure taken einee L977 to regulate Eagt-Wcat Europcan
inland navigation was the sigming on 17 @tobex 1979 of Additlonal
Protocol t{o. 2 to the revised convention of Mannheim on the navigation
of the Rhine by the Central Commisgion for thc Navigation of the Rhine.
This additional protoeol amends Article 2(3) and Article 4 of the
Mannheim coavcntion with a view to clarifying the eritcria for bclonging
to Rhinc navigation and to authorizing only Rhine navigation vcscels
which ean show the appropriate ecrtificate to carry goods and trnsscrrgers
on the Rhine and its trlbutaries without special authorization. other
vessels may only navigatc the Rhine subjeet to certain conditione laid
dourn by thc central commission. Morcovcr, thc eonditlone for thc
carriagc of goods and passengcrs bctrrccn thc abovc waterways and third
countriee by vessels not belonginE to Rhine navigation are to bc Laid
down bilatcratly bctween the two partics eoncerned (two-way traffic
' between a niparian Rhine state and a coMECoN state).
47 - By declsion of 24 July 1979 the counci!- of the EEc approved the
additionar protocol. To prevent any dieerimination betwcen vessers
from EEc eountries whieh are not sigmatories to thc Mannhcim convention
and those that are, the ratter undertake to trcat vessclg entitl.ed to
fly the frag of an EEc lt{ember state in the came way as Rhine navigation
vessele. This mcans that vessels from all EEC eountries wLlI remain
entitled to carry freight on the Rhine without epecial authorization.
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48' rt !,!8 a18o agrecd in an outline protocol to Additional protocol No. 2that the ccrtifl'cate of rnembcrehlp of Rhinc navigation could bc aranted
only to a vcegel whieh had a gcnuine conncction with the country
concerned' Thc actual evidence rcquircd muet be agrecd by the contract-ing atatec.
49' The outlinc protocol also covers the question of frcedqr of establigh-
ment' The Propoeed measure ia deeigned to prevent ahipping eomfanLea
from col{EcoN frorn estabrishing branches ,in riparian Rhine
countrieg or EEc Ittenber states and flying their flage.
50' t{hen the rcquired evidence of a genuine conncetion betwccn state and
vessel is rpeeifLed, it ir important to cngure that both thc wrncra
of a shipping eompany and thc managcrs of a eapital invcatmcnt eompany
who dircetly or indirectry hold a deeisivc majority of thc gharca or
the votcs are eitlzcns of an EEc Mcmbcr statc and the eapital originatea
in the Commtrnity
51- The additional protoeol is subjcct to ratifieation. The Fcderal
Republic of G€rmany haa alrcudy complctcd thc ratification procedure.
52' Additional Protoeol No. 2 is an cffeetlvc mcan! of prcvcnting unbridled
and porelbry ruinoue eompctition from corrrECoN shipplng companies.
whieh might thrcatcn thc vcry curvlval of Rhine navlgatlon. By itlclf,
however, it eannot do thic effcctivcly. rt ie equatly imlnrtant for ths
outlinc Protoeol to be fillcd out, for the additionel protocol will bc
ugelesg unlcse the question of freedom of cstablishment ie gettled.
53' The ncw Articre 4 of the Mannhcim convcntion rays dotrn the eonditions
for the carriage of goodc and paesengers betwecn thc Rhine area and
third countriee on the baeis of agrcemente bstwcen the two partics.
The Fedcral Rcpublie has already made somc such agrccmcntg. rn I9z1
thi Fedcral Ministry of Transport signed an agreement with the polich
Ministry oi TransPort on inland navigation between the two eountrles
which is ctirl in forec. Yet thc tcrma of the agreemcnt havc atill
not been imprcmcntcd saticfactority ginec the agrccd 50:50 traftic_
sharing ratio has not yet been aehiavcd. On averaglc, Fcderal GGrnran
navigation stlll only accounte for about 10% of traffic betwccn thc
two countrice.
54' A transport agreement which alco eoverg inrand navigation waa signed
by the GDR and thc Federal Republie in Lg72. Again Federal vessers
only have a 10-15% ghare of the traffLc. Howaver, thic agrccmcnt does
not contlin a elausc speeifyinE the distribution of traffic betwecn
the two countriee.
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55. Because of the unsatisfactory results of these two agreemcnts, the
Federal Government decided to aim at clearer and more binding provisione
in similar bilateral agreements. It initialled an agreemcnt of thie
type with Auetria on 18 September 1980. Austria is not a
CO!4ECON state and is part of the Western economic systcm; it is,
however, a Danube state. The agreement with Austria ie to aerve as a
model for all further agreements on inland navigation to bc signed with
COMECON oountries.
56. A draft agreement is already under discuseion with Czechoslovakia.
Tatks have also been held with Bu1garia, P.omania, Hungary and the
Soviet Union on relations in inland navigation.
57. It has been suggested that the Community might also eonelude sueh agree-
ments with the COMECON eountries. At present, inland navigation undar-
takings tend to prefer bilateral agreemcnts, for wtiieh the additional
protoeol to the Mannheim Conventisn makes formal provision. Ehe other
Community t'tember States should thcrefore also aim at sueh agreements
at the appropriate time. Ehe approval by the CounciL of Ministere of
the additional protocol to the Mannheim Convention meana that bilateral
agrecments are rccognized as compatible with EEC legielation.
58. Neverthclcss,
not asgume an
59. The Coffirunity
Conventlon in
the Commiseion should consider whether the Community eould
active role here.
has algo approved the additionel protocol to thc Mannheim
the field of inland navigation.
further measure!!.' What ic needed now is for the
to the Mannheim Convention to be ratified and for
to be eompleted by the Rhine Central Commigsion.
ft has not taken any
additisnal protoeol
the outline protoeol
60. Above all, the Community must make rapid progress with its oyrn inland
navigation poliey so that once thc ltain-Danube €anal is eomplcted it
ean negotiate with the COMECON countries, whieh w111 presg
vigorously for a share in Rhine traffic, from a posltion of strengrth.
51. What is liable to happen unless the Communlty hae agrccd on a comnon
position on inland navigation poliey by then can be sccn in the case
of Danube navigation, where Austrian and German shitrlping companies have
been almogt entirely ousted by COII{ECON vessels which compete uneconomically.
62. A common inland navigation policy should include meaaurcs aimed at social,
fiscal and technical harmonization, and the question of compensation for
infrastructure coats would best be solved if the Community had to negotiate
with the CODIECON countries on their share in Rhine navlgati-on aftcr thc
completion of the ![ain-Danube Canal. The same applies to a common price
and capacity policy.
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63. There are also special social Problems involved in inland navigation with
the COMECON countries which need to be raised in the transPort negotiations.
The main problem is the freedom of movement of workers during lay-days in
COMECON ports but adequate solutions have also not yet been found to the
problems of the'social infrastructure' in the ports and legal protection.
v. ShiPPing
64. Organization of shipping in coMECoN countries. All shipping operations in
COMECON countries are controlled by the state. LegaIIy, the shipping companies
are regarded as independent units responsible for their internal adrninistration,
but in practice they are strictly subject to state economic planning and
organization. The international shipping lines of the col{EcoN states are
' operated by state-owned companies. In the soviet union, merchant shipping
is coordinated by the llinistry for the llerchant Fleet and freight contracts
are handled by the 'Sovinflotr agencyr which controles the agencies' activities
in foreign ports and has a monopoly over the representation of foreign shipping
companies in Soviet Ports.
65. This system of organizing ahipping lincs hae a numbcr of advantag'a:
(1) Low capital eosts, bceaugc thc gtate as ahip ohmcr ean atgumc
.themdircetly(rclcrvcefordepreeiltignc,expenditureonrercareh
and invcctigatione, insurlnee' rcpaire and intcrest on loane) '
(2)Lowwagceoatg(wagceandgoeialeeeuritycontributione)ainec
wages arc far lowcr than in thc !{cat and many scam€n often do
their militery scrvlec on merchant shipa'
(3) Low lncrgy coste bceauge thc shipping comlnnica buy fuel at
subgidized Pricee'
(4)Preferentialtariffc,especiallyforbunkeringandtrrcrtehargcs
in thc various sovereign 
"""""I
56. coMEcoN shipping aims. unlike the western liner services' the colt'lEcoN
shjppingcomPaniesdonotPursuepurelycomrnercialaims,}rutrather
Iong-term economic, Political and strategic aims'
67. Firstly, tncrc ig thc aim of ourting Wcatern traffic, whieh ic a
5nlitical aln. Thc Wcrt ir hcavily dclrcndcnt on cca tradc bceaugc
it ie neecalary for itr rurvival in the cvcnt of a crigie. (?hc'
COMECON eountrics, on thc other hend. in partieular the Ssvict UnLon,
are hardly dclrcndcnt on sca trldc at all bceause of thcir mueh hiEhcr
dcaree of sclf-gufficicncy. ) oueting a large number sf Wcctcrn ahipping
lince would grcatly strengrthen thc potitieal lnfluence of'the
COITiECON ctatcc in thc Third World end weakcn thc polltieal influcnce
of the West.
Icf. ggc Economie and Social ComrLttcc,'EransPort Problems in Eastern
Europe - EEc relationg', Brussels, November L977, PP. 45, 46 and
Anna E. Bredimas, 'Ehc Conmon ShipPing Po1icy of the EEC' in Common
ltarkct Law Rcview, 18, I February 1S1, pp- 24-25.
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6E.ThetecoFdainconcernathebalanceofPayments.Byobtainingas
muchWegtcrnforeignexchangeasPoeBlble,theEagternEirtopean
EtatGs may man'J,e to nake up for the substantial deflclts in their
balance of paymentE in relation to that of the Iaatern induetrialized
. 
statee.
69. 1rfre thirdl aln ia milltary and etrateglc. fhe Merchant Ulvy 5 grcn
as a factor of national defence. lltrrough ite shiPPlrg, East€ln EuroP€
obtains a general view of the Etructure of t{lester'n trade, western
ships, port facilitieEl working mettrods, etc. and creates a large
potential workforce of qualified Eeamen'
?O. Unegual conditions of competition. In their }rilateral transport
relations the coMEeoN states aim at obtaining a nonopoly for their liner
service shipping and of traffic from ind to their ports'. Moreover,
restrictions are placed on ships other than Sov,iet vesgels takihg on
cargo for a third country in Soviet ports. Yet Soviet. ahiPs are quite
free to load or unload cargo in aII EEC ports as rcrOss traders'.
7L. Theee restrictiona on the operation of lincr ccrviccs from the
soviet ltnion to third countriee by western shippLng companies are
bascd clther on bilateral agreemcnts betrrecn the soviet union and thlrd
countri€8 which provide for a 5O:5O distribution of cargo' or on
unilateral freight reEtrictions irnposed on non-soviet shlpe'
72. Western shipping companiee have no rights of establiehment ln COMECON
countries, nor can they set up,any independent agencies there (unlike the
companies of CO!{ECON countriee which can-establish thenselves in the
west and build uP a network of aElencieg there) '
73. The state companies can aleo buy or acguire majority ehares ln ttaneit'
consignment or shipping companies in the wcst, while the g,egtern
companiea cannot do thiE in COIiECON countries becauge all the'companies
are Etate-or*ned.
74. Recent developments lYt shippinq: llhe sovlet merchant fl€et continued
to expand betrvcen 1976 and 1980, from 13.o million grt ln 1976 to
15.9 grt in 1980, L.e. by 22f*. :Ittis includcd 22o vcgsclg with a
capacity of 2 million tohrtae engaged ln national liner traffic. llltc
Russianc dcclare that their mcrchant fltet has mercly expanded in
Iine wLth the increase in their foreign trade. But their orrt etatLaticr
tefutt thls assertion, for Soviet foreign trade rose from 185 rnlllion
tonnes in 1976 to 2O1 rnillion tonnes in 1979, i.e. by 996 (dluc mainly
to the increase in grain importe) compared to the 22% expaneion of
the merchant flcet over the same period 1975-1980'1
1t1t 
""" 
figures have been tak€n from a study by the Srvedl-gh Brogtr6ma
group ,S6viet Liner Services in InternatLonal Tradet , '.fanuary-,June
'1980, pp. 1-4
- 
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75. The soviet companies behave as outsiders in liner traffic' Their prices
have always been far below Western prices. For example' the freight rates
oftheBalticorientLine,e.g.foritscontainerservicebetweenHong
Kong, Singapore, Malaysia and Community ports, have always been 30t lower
than the corresponding Western conference freight rates'
During the 1976-1980 period the competition from the Trans-siberian Railway
(Trans-SiberianContainerLine,TSCL)alsoincreased.TheTsCl,carries
transit goods via a netowrk of rail, road and sea routes and is controlled
by a state organization which is responsible to the soviet t'tinistry of Trad'
The increased importance of the TSCL can be seen from the foltowing table:
Carriage of goods by ttre Far Eas-tern Freight Conference
FEFCr and the TSCL
76.
270
404
601
79L
720
889
1, 086
L,215
L,322
576
FEFC
3,162
3 ,447
3,47 I
2,883
3,263
3,67L
3,387
3,258
4,249
2,L53
7.9
10.5
14.8
2t.5
18.1
19.5
24.3
27 .2
23.7
21.I
59
r87
342
250
443
428
534
651
529
240
1,279
2,L24
2,l-8l
1, 370
1, 410
1,404
1,7 49
2,oL6
1,567
828
4.4
8.L
13 .6
15.4
23.9
23 .4
23.4
24.5
25.?
22.5
TSCL
TSCL +
tof
FEFC
TSCL t of
TSCL + FEFC
L97 2
197 3
L97 4
1975
197 5
L97 7
197 I
l.9'19
1980
first half
r98 1
( 1,000
Source: CAACE
17.
The rate of TCSL growth seems to have eased off somewhat roently' partly as
a result of the situation in Afghanistan and partly due to the general
recess ion.
The TSCL rates are lower than the corresponding liner freight rates
of the ulestern conferencee although as a rule sea transPort costs
Iees. This suggests that the ratee applied by the TscL do not cover
costs, i.e. thdt \^re are dealing here with a case of dumping' llttis
supposition is supported by the following comparisoin of IISCL rates
with the rates of four western railway lines:-
US $ o.12 TEU/nile-
us $ o.27 rr rr
us $ o.43 rr rt
us $ o.25 rr rr
us $ o.24 rr tr
. TSCL
- 
Freemantle/SYdneY
- 
Winnipeg,4'tontreal
- 
us west coast'/u6'Gulf'
- 
US west @ast^S East coast
1-h. a*" incrudes
^of over 3 million
lcoltscox freights
'source: CAACE
29 companies fromgrt
are not included in
-2L-
19 countries with a total tonnage
the figures 'to the West'
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to the west to the EasL
TSCL I FETC
The pressure of competition will become even stronger with the construction
of the second, more northerly Trans-Siberian Railway ( lBAI,t,).
zg. passenqer services are also being severely affectedrparticularly by soviet
cruises. This is especially true of Mediterranean cruises whioh l,|ere once
Iargely operated by Italian lines but are now dominated by the soviet union
79. The reason why the growing strength of coMECoN fleets, which are perhaps
still relatively srnall' Poses such a major threat to Cornmunity BhipPing
as a whole is that this comes on top of a number of other problems' For
example it has not proved possible to Prevent 50:50 agreements being
concluded in a large number of countries and there is increasing competition
from 'flags of convenience' which firstly undercut vessels which maintain
normal technical safety standards and secondly represent a drain on capital'
as a result of changes in the countries of registration' Although this
report only deils with competition from colitEcoN, it is important to see
these issues in context.
80. present community policy. since the council decision of 19 December 1978
the European community has introduced a system of obligatory notification
for soviet vessels docking in community ports. In December 1980 the
'observation systemr tdas extended for a further two years to the end of
1983 and expanded to include far Eastern routes'
where necessary the community should constantly seek to improve the notifi-
cati.on system. It would also be useful if the volume of trade between the,
Community and the Far East via the Trans- Siberian Container Line r'rg.fe
monitored.
No further measures have yet been taken at Community level. We must not
arrive at a stage where the Community simply observes and takes no action!
gl. proposals for a future Community policy. The robservation system' is really
only an information system and gives no protection against the dumping
practices of the Soviet merchant fleet and the TSCL. Yet a number of
measures can be added to the observation system if necessary.
By their nature such measures should be flexible and be introduced before
the expiry of the extended observation sybtem'
82. Protective measures could take the following forms:
I. Introduction of a system of quotas for the chartering of Soviet ships
in Community ports if these ships operate in liner traffic. This system
should also cover shipments both ways between EEC countries and the Far
East made by the Trans-Siberian Container Line which is a multi-modal
transport undertaking.
2. Sanctions, e.9. taxes, if quotas are exceeded'
3. An equalization tax on ships engaged in'non-commerical'competition in
order to align their rates with those of the Western liner conferences.
Here too the Trans-Siberian Container Line should be included.
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Obviousty, such measures could be successful only if they were implemented
on a Corununity basis.
83. As in inland navigation, there are a number of social problems relating to
workers in shipping to which no solution has been found. The seamen should
have freedom of movement in the ports. General improvements are needed for
social facilities and lega1 protection. We cannot call for an expansion of
transport links between western shipping tines and the COMECON iountries if
the seamen are exposed to intolerable conditions in COMECON ports.
VI. Air
84. The situation is not as serious in air transport as for the other modes of
transport. This is partly because scheduled services in particular are
state run in the West too and normally adhere strictly to the principle of
reciprocity embodied in bilateral agreements based on a standard agreement
for all states involved in world air transport.
western airlines can only be ousted from scheduled services if the West
refuses to share profita under a pooling agreement, because the state
organizations in the COI{ECON countries can specify on which lines commercial
outbound cargo is transported. Pooling agreements have usually succeeded
in allocating profite to aIlow even the western airlines to provide
satisfactory services.
The CoMECON airlines are increasingly applying the tariffs agreed under
the IATA multilateral tariff negotiations (although not a1I of them belong
to IATA)
These tariff arrangenrents are normally incorporated into bilateral agree-
ments. In cases shere the volume of traffic is not sufficient to cover
costs, the western airlines usually cease to operate while the COMECON
airlines continue to fly even at a loss.
85. The basis for calculating the cost of charter services is quite different
for COIvIECON airlines than Western airlines because there are usually no
minimum-tariff regulations or these can be circumvented by the state
airlines.
86. rn air transtrlort the cslECoN countries clearry arso pursue a vig-
oroua expaneionist poricy without regard for profit or for the
level of consumer suppries. rt is werl known that the rate of
utilization of Eastern European aircraft, measured in flight hours
per day, is onry harf that of the western airlines. cbst factord
are obviously not taken into account at al1. and, as presumably also
appl-ies to the crews, the cost is not borne by the companies but by
the national budget, possibly the defence budget. At times this is
also the case in the west, in that many advances in aircraft equip-
ment.occur as spin-offs of military developments, as a result of
whlch material costs are lower, aIlhough all other costs must be
borne in fuIl by the airline companies.
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87.
88.
89.
90.
9r.
92.
As regards air freight western companies are even less at risk from
COMECON competition because the COMECON airlines use
mainly Soviet aircraft; because of the baclsrardness of Soviet
aircraft engineering there is much less capacity to carry freight
in passenger aircraft. l.toreover, much lesE air freight goes in an
East-West direction in bilateral traffic than the reverse, since
as a rule processed Western products are still traded for Eastern
European raw materials and agricultural products. The proportion
of processed products in the exports of thb etitc-Erading countries
is only rising slowly.
For that reaEon, the guestion of .rights of establishment is not as
important in air transport'as in road transport or shipping, although
the presence of Western companies in COMECON capitals 6till
leaves something to be desired and this question could become more
important in the future'i^ COIIECON exports become more
diversified.
Rights of establ-ishment could also assume some imlrortance in charter
transport. At present the situation'here Eeems to be that Western
eharter eompanies cannot compete an]ruay f,or cost roalrons (i.e.
because of the undercutting regardlesE of cost practised by the
Cpl,tEcON countries) . It might be possible for the Conununity to make
progrress here by coordinating Western policies.
VII. Conclusions
The various modes of transport ale affected in various ways by the
competition from the state-trading countries, but whether the cont-
petition ie strong or weak, the principle remaine the sames on the
basis pf poLitical decisions which iay no regard to the level of
supplies to the people, the COMECON countries can exploit the freedom
of the western market to embark on expansion irrespective of cost.
The west can onry defend itself against the resulting drawbacks by
state action, End here the adoption of a joint position ie often more
J-ikery to be sucEessfur than bilateral negotiations; the cormnunity
thus has a challengc to face here.
rt is important to state guite crearry once again that we are notproposing a policy of containment: on the contrary, East_WestEuropean trade must be encouraged. rf the coMEcoN countries can offercheaper and better transport, western shippers should have theopportunity to exploit this suppry as rong as this does notjeopardize the existence of western transport undertakings. Norcan one object to the fact that the coMECoN countries want to makeup for their negati.ve trade balance by a positive services balance.
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93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
yet it is not acceptable that western transport interests should be
entirety subordinated to trade interests, even in cases where the
competition from the coMEcoN countries is clearly uneconomic.
What is being proposed here ie not €conornic warfare eit}er, but
merely protection againet thc erlpansionism of the Etate economy"
countries by applying aPproPriate state transport poltcY measurea.
Hitherto our tradLhg and negotiating partners in the C\IMECON countries
have usually showed somc un(teratanding when the West has told them
that they cannot keep all the transPort to themselves. But one cannot
blarne them for trying to do Eo if the West does not take any counter-
measures.
In spite of all the differ€ncea between the Eastern and West€In
Europ€an economic ayat€ms, there are fortunately also eome principles
whLch alao make peaccful coexistence poseible in the field of trade
and tranEport Policy, including primarily the priciple of reciprocal
advantage, rchich the @!{BcoN countries have always recognized.
In any caae tlre Comrission ehouLd carefully follow developments in all
modeE of tranaport and in poit systems and devise defeneive inetruments
which can be us€d r,aPiilly and ftrexibly whete appropriate. lhe West
should not ohly observe but also act. Wtren ttre Main-Danube canal is
finisheQ-t]r-eqE-4Stglg-eg must be rgady;. alttro-ugh it is now not
expected to be colfiPlet€d aa aoon as waa once thought, it will never-
theless be readlz before the end of the decade.
In the long tern, the interests of the @ME@N and ttre @mnunity
countries run parallcl: both want to expand their trade, and in the
long run they can achieve thie only if t-he transport situation offers
advantagcs io both sides.
Ttrere is also an area of traneport poli'cy where the two tidee have
identical inter'este, that of infrastructure policy for routes from
the Co!,IECG{ couYrtriea to the Co[Euunity countries. A study by the
1
united Nati.ons' fonnd ttrat if East-West European trade continues to
grolr, bottlenecks could already aPpear in transport infraEtructure
in this decade. .Ioint transport infrasiructure planning coul-d build
up Eome tru€t between the CpIttBCON countries and the eomnunity.
Ihe committee on Transport accordingly requests the European
Parliament to adopt ite nption f,or a resolution.
1
'united wations,/rconomic Commission
European Goods Traffic Flows', Doc.
t979
for Europe: 'Study on East-Wcat
ECE/TRAIIS 39, Geneva, New York
100.
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Annex
!,!OTION FOR A RESoLTTION (Doc . L-685/79)
tabled by !{r MoRELAI{D, lrtr JAKOBSEN, Mr MOORHOUSE, !j[r cqrTRELL,
Lord HARMAR-NICHOI,LS, SiT PETET VA}INECK, liIT KIRK, MT PROT}T,
Mr Christopher JAcKsoN, sir David NIcoLSoN, Mr de cotRcY LING,
ur HORD, Dame Shelagh RoBERTS, Mr HUTTON,',l'lr cuRRY, Mr SELIGMAN'
Mr TURMR, Mr HARRfST MF1ELLETT-BOiFIAN; Mr John Dhvid TCYL'GR,
Mr SHERLoCK, Mr TYRRELL, Miss HooPER, Mr BATTERSBY, t{r PRICE,
t1r HOWELL and Mr SIMI4ONS
pursuant to RuIe 25 of the Rules of Proeedure
on the uae of transport from the COMECON countries
The European Parliament,
- Is concerned at the increaee in the use of traneport modeE whieh
originate in CONIECON eountriea, belleving that chargea madc to
users of theae modes of transport are artificially 1or,
- 
Is concerned that the effect of such competition ie damaging to
the shipping, road haulage and other transport industrieg of the
CommunltY.
CaIIs on the Commission
1. To produce proposals for the regulation of comecon-owned
transport as it affects the Cotnrnunity,
2. To ensure that charges applied to users of comeeon-transport
modes are realistic and fair and not a reflection of hidden
subsidies,
3. To encourage the maximuxr use of Community owned modes of tranetrmrt
both within the Corununity and between the Community and the rest
of the world,
4. To engure that any rights given by Member States to allorr the
transPort of people and goode between the comrunity and the
COMECON countries are reciprocal.
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